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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Yutdeny McLeod appeals from the district court's order revoking her probation. 
On appeal, Ms. McLeod asserts that the district court erred when it overruled her 
objection to the use of statements obtained from her in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, which resulted in her probation being revoked and the original sentence 
being executed without reduction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. McLeod pleaded guilty to grand theft by unauthorized control, and received a 
unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed. The sentence was suspended 
in favor of thirteen years of probation. (R., pp.104-09.) Without being released from 
custody to report to the probation department, Ms. McLeod was deported. (Tr., p.61, 
L.15 - p.62, L.5.) Several years later, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Probation and 
Issue a Warrant, alleging that Ms. McLeod had violated her probation by (1) failing to 
report to her probation officer, and (2) failing to obey all laws by "illegally re-entering the 
United States." (R., pp.130-31.) A warrant was issued by the district court. (R., p.139.) 
The warrant was served in New York, and Ms. McLeod was extradited to Idaho. 
(Tr., p.51, Ls.12-15, p.99, Ls.9-14, p.108, Ls.1-2.) 
At an evidentiary hearing on the probation violations, the State called Mark Rees, 
an agent with the "criminal alien program" at the Department of Homeland Security's 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency. Agent Rees had interviewed 
Ms. McLeod in the Twin Falls County Jail after she was extradited to Idaho. When 
Agent Rees attempted to testify as to statements that he'd obtained from Ms. McLeod, 
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defense counsel objected, and, after establishing that Ms. McLeod was not informed of 
her Miranda1 rights, that she was in custody, and that what Agent Rees learned from 
her could be used to prosecute her for illegal re-entry into the United States, moved to 
exclude such testimony as having been obtained in violation of Ms. McLeod's Fifth 
Amendment rights. (Tr., p.47, L.18 - p.54, L.11.) The district court sustained the 
objection, but allowed the State time to prepare a response to defense counsel's 
argument. (Tr., p.47, L.18 - p.55, L.20.) 
The State filed a Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Objection, in which it 
argued that Agent Rees' questioning of Ms. McLeod did not constitute an interrogation 
for Miranda purposes because the questions were not reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response, his investigation was for purposes of civil deportation only, and 
was limited to "a routine administrative check into the defendant's status as an alien." In 
support of its argument, the State cited to several Ninth Circuit cases dealing with 
questions asked of incarcerated immigrants. (R., pp.172-76.) 
Ultimately, the district court reversed its earlier decision sustaining defense 
counsel's objection, and overruled the objection to Agent Rees' testimony. The district 
court gave three reasons for its reversal. First, it found that, in determining whether 
Miranda warnings were required, the court must "look to the subjective intent of the 
officer or of the agent." In that respect, the district court found that because no 
evidence indicated that Agent Rees had any intent to elicit incriminating information 
from Ms. McLeod the Fifth Amendment was not implicated. Second, the district court 
cited to an article in the American Law Reports explaining that probationers need not be 
given Miranda warnings prior to questioning by their probation officers because "the 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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self-incrimination privilege is fundamentally inconsistent with the maintenance of a 
probationary system[.]" While the district court acknowledged that Agent Rees was not 
a probation officer, it nonetheless concluded that "the authority holds true." Finally, the 
district court found that the condition of probation requiring Ms. McLeod to provide her 
identity, her supervision status, and the name of her supervising officer to any law 
enforcement officer with whom she came into contact was "in essence" a requirement 
that she "waive her Fifth Amendment rights, if any, to remain silent" when confronted by 
a law enforcement officer.2 (Tr., p.93, L.1 O - p.96, L.10.) 
After the objection was overruled, Agent Rees testified that he asked 
Ms. McLeod a number of questions, including "when and where she entered the country 
the last time, [and] if she was smuggled." As a result of these questions, he learned 
that, early in 2011, Ms. McLeod had entered the United States illegally through 
Montana, having paid a smuggler $8,000 to help her cross the border, and travelled to 
Idaho. (Tr., p.97, L.8-p.101, L.11.) 
The State then called Amanda Sanders to testify. Ms. Sanders testified that she 
saw Ms. McLeod on January 20, 2011, at the "St. Luke's Clinic Orthopedrcs and Plastic 
Surgery" with her daughter and ex-husband, and that Ms. McLeod's daughter was being 
seen that day as a patient. (Tr., p.110, L.15 - p.112, L.1.) State's Exhibit No. 4, which 
had previously been admitted, is a document from St Luke's Orthopedic and Plastic 
Surgery Clinic, containing Ms. McLeod's name and that of her daughter, and contains a 
2 In applying this reasoning to Officer Rees, the district court found that "both counsel" 
had indicated that Officer Rees was a member of law enforcement. (Tr., p.96, Ls.2-7.) 
This finding is supported by the record, which included the prosecuting attorney 
explaining, "[H]e carries a badge. I think he had arrest powers[,]" and defense counsel 
describing him as "Agent Rees[.]" (Tr., p.91, Ls.9-16.) 
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notation that her daughter had medical appointment for an incident that occurred on 
January 17, 2011.3 (Tr., p.66, L.9 - p.67, L.22; State's Exhibit No. 4.) 
At the earlier hearing, the State called Leslie Horner, Ms. McLeod's probation 
officer, who testified that she spoke with Ms. McLeod after she was sentenced, 
explained the conditions and requirements of probation, including the requirement that 
she obey all local, state, and federal laws, and that she had never been contacted by 
Ms. McLeod. She also testified that she learned that Ms. McLeod had been deported 
without having been released from jail, and, as a result, Ms. McLeod's probation had 
been converted to unsupervised probation because deported persons are not expected 
to report to the probation department on a regular basis. (Tr., p.58, L.6 - p.77, L.19.) 
After hearing argument, the district court found Ms. McLeod committed both 
alleged violations and that she did so willfully. (Tr., p.124, L.2 - p.126, L.2.) At the 
disposition hearing the State requested that the district court revoke Ms. McLeod's 
probation without reducing the underlying sentence. (Tr., p.140, L.23 - p.141, L.1.) 
Defense counsel asked that the district court commute an unspecified portion of her 
sentence, and give her credit for the one-hundred eighty days she served as a condition 
of probation at the beginning of her sentence. (Tr., p.146, L.23 - p.147, L.16.) Relying 
on the testimony elicited from Mr. Rees, the district court revoked Ms. McLeod's 
probation and declined to reduce her sentence or give her credit for the time served as 
a condition of probation. (Tr., p.148, L.17 - p.152, L.18.) 
Ms. McLeod filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 
(R., p.194.) After the district court denied her Rule 35 motion4 (R., p.204), she filed a 
Notice of Appeal timely from the order revoking her probation. (R., p.213.) 
3 State's Exhibit No. 4 was found at the home of Ms. McLeod's parents in Shoshone, 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it admitted, over Ms. McLeod's objection, testimony as to 
statements obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment? 
Idaho. (p.63, L.17 - p.67, L.1.) 
4 Ms. McLeod does not appeal from the denial of her Rule 35 motion because she had 
previously filed a Rule 35 motion, and was, therefore, not entitled to relief on a second 
motion. See I. C.R. 35. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted, Over Ms. McLeod's Objection, Testimony As 
To Statements Obtained In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it admitted statements made by Ms. McLeod to 
Agent Rees that were obtained in violation of her rights under the Fifth Amendment. 
Because the district court relied on the unlawfully obtained information when it revoked 
her probation and declined to reduce her underlying sentence, she was harmed by its 
admission, and she is entitled to a new probation violation hearing at which such 
evidence will not be considered. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Although a court's decision to admit evidence at a probation violation hearing is 
generally within that court's discretion and will not be overturned unless that discretion 
has been abused, "the determination whether constitutional requirements have been 
satisfied is subject to free review." State v. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765 (citing State v. 
Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71 (2002) and State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494 (2006)). 
Ms. McLeod objected to the admission of statements she made to Agent Rees as 
having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment; therefore, the appropriate 
standard of review in this matter is de nova. (R., p.147.) 
C. The District Court Erred When It Admitted 1 Over Ms. McLeod's Objection, 
Testimony As To Statements Obtained In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." U.S. CONST., amend. V. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted 
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this provision to require the use of certain "[p]rocedural safeguards" to protect the Fifth 
Amendment privilege when a suspect is in custody. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 479 (1966). Those procedural safeguards are that, prior to any such questioning, 
a government agent must warn a suspect that he has the right to remain silent, that 
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to an 
attorney, that if he cannot afford to hire an attorney one will be provided for him at public 
expense, and that he may invoke these rights5 at any time. Id. "[U]nless and until such 
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained 
as a result of interrogation can be used against him." Id. 
In this case, the district court overruled defense counsel's objection to the use of 
statements obtained from Ms. McLeod by a federal immigration officer, Agent Rees, 
while she was incarcerated in the Twin Falls County Jail for a probation violation and an 
immigration hold, and without having informed her of her Miranda rights. (Tr., p.47, L.18 
- p.54, L.11; p.93, L.10 - p.96, L.10.) Agent Rees' questioning resulted in Ms. McLeod 
admitting that she had entered the United States illegally in early 2011, paid a smuggler 
$8,000 to do so, and that she had travelled to Idaho after illegally entering the United 
States. (Tr., p.97, L.8 - p.101, L.11.) The district court's overruling of the objection was 
predicated on its misunderstanding and misapplication of several legal principles. 
5 As the Court of Appeals recently explained in State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430 (Ct. App. 
2011 ), "Strictly speaking, there is no 'Fifth Amendment right to counsel.' Instead ... the 
right to be informed of and to the presence and assistance of counsel is afforded in 
custodial contexts, in limited circumstances, in order to protect a suspect's Fifth 
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination during interrogation. The term 
has evolved as a shorthand way of describing the right involved." Id. at 431 n.2 (internal 
citation omitted). 
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1. Miranda Warnings Must Be Given Prior To Questioning Regardless Of 
The Subjective Intent Of The Government Agent 
The first basis upon which the district court overruled defense counsel's objection 
was its belief that the subjective intent of Officer Rees was the controlling factor in 
determining whether Miranda warnings were required. Specifically, the court, citing 
United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Solano-
Godines, 120 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1997), reasoned that "the court essentially looks to the 
subjective intent of the officer or agent" and whether he was seeking to obtain 
information "for the purpose of getting a probationer's probation revoked." In this case, 
the district court concluded that there had been no showing that Officer Rees was acting 
with a "motive" of getting Ms. McLeod's probation revoked, and, as such, Miranda 
warnings were not required. (Tr., p.93, L.10 - p.94, L.13.) An examination of the two 
cases on which the district court primarily will show that they can be readily 
distinguished from the facts of Ms. McLeod's case. 
In Salgado, Salgado, who had been booked into jail on state weapons charges, 
was interviewed by an immigration official, Lundgren, after admitting, during booking, 
that he was not a United States citizen. The immigration official questioned him "to 
determine whether he was subject to an administrative action for deportation." While 
being questioned, Salgado acknowledged having entered the United States illegally. 
He was deported shortly thereafter. Over one year after being deported, he was again 
arrested on state charges, and was questioned about his citizenship status. After a 
review of his file by an immigration agent, including his earlier statements to Lundgren 
that resulted in his deportation the previous year, Salgado was charged with "being 
found in the United States without permission after previously being deported." 
Salgado, 292 F.3d at 1171-72. 
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Salgado moved to suppress, inter alia, the statements he made to Lundgren prior 
to his deportation. In denying his suppression motion, the trial court found, 
Lundgren's sole purpose in eliciting Salgado's biographical information 
was to determine if he were subject to an administrative action for 
deportation. Further, it found that there was no evidence that Salgado 
was suspected of a crime to which his nationality was relevant at the time 
of the interview, and that Lundgren could not reasonably anticipate the 
future incriminating quality of the statements that she elicited. 
Id., 292 F.3d at 1172. 
In analyzing the issue, the Ninth Circuit stated the test for determining whether 
questioning is considered interrogation under Miranda as "whether under all of the 
circumstances involved in a given case, the questions are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). In upholding the trial court's denial of Salgado's motion to suppress, the Ninth 
Circuit noted, 
If Salgado had been interviewed in connection with a "prosecution for 
violating the immigration laws," or if Salgado had been in custody on 
charges relating to his immigration status, then questions about birthplace 
and citizenship might have been reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response in which case he should have been Mirandized before-hand. 
Id. (emphases in original). In concluding that there was no interrogation, and thus no 
Miranda violation, the Court found it significant that 
the response became incriminating only after the passage of a substantial 
period of time and after the defendant had been deported, had illegally 
reentered the country and had been arrested on state charges unrelated 
to his immigration status. 
Id., 292 F.3d at 1174. 
The most obvious distinction between Ms. McLeod's situation and that in 
Salgado is that Ms. McLeod had been deported prior to being questioned by Agent 
Rees, rather than after, and as a result of, such questioning. In Salgado, the Court 
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found the passage of more than one year between the questioning and the nature of the 
answers becoming incriminating to be significant. Another distinction is that the 
questions asked by Agent Rees went beyond the types of routine questions asked by 
the immigration official in Salgado, namely birthplace and citizenship, and specifically 
asked about her re-entry and whether she was smuggled. (Tr., p.97, L.8 - p.101, L.11.) 
These questions resulted in the very answers that formed the basis for a probation 
violation for violating federal law by illegally re-entering the United States. 
The district court was mistaken when it concluded that the test for determining 
whether Miranda warnings must be given was based on "the subjective intent of the 
officer or agent" in questioning a suspect. Miranda is clear: 
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless 
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). The only test to be employed as to 
whether Miranda warnings must be given prior to express questioning by a government 
agent is whether the person so questioned is in "custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way."6 
The Idaho Court of Appeals, citing Innis, has held that the requirements of 
Miranda "come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express 
6 The district court may have confused its analysis with the test for determining when 
police behavior other than questioning can constitute an interrogation. See Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) ("[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of 
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect"). 
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questioning or its functional equivalent." State v. Harms, 137 Idaho 891, 894 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing Innis and State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364 (Ct. App. 1999)) (emphasis 
added). The Harms court then explained, 
[T]he term "functional equivalent" refers to any words or actions on the 
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect. 
Id (emphasis added). 
Thus, a reading of Miranda, Innis, and Harms discloses that Miranda warnings 
are required to be given to an in-custody suspect prior to express questioning -
regardless of the intent of the interrogator - or prior to the use of words or actions that 
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect. The use of the phrase "should know" indicates that the individual officer's 
subjective intent is irrelevant to a determination of whether a government actor's 
conduct amounted to the functional equivalent of interrogation. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 
301 ("the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added 
measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective 
proof of the underlying intent of the police") (emphasis added). 
To the extent that the Ninth Circuit, in Salgado, has misinterpreted Innis as 
somehow requiring a defendant seeking suppression of responses to express 
questioning following a failure to Mirandize to establish that the police should know that 
such express questioning was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, the 
clear language in Innis and Harms, both of which are binding authority in Idaho trial 
courts, disposes of the importance of any such holding. 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the test for determining whether express 
questioning of a suspect in custody was whether the questions were reasonably likely to 
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elicit an incriminating response, it is difficult to posit how asking a person being detained 
in part on an immigration hold who has illegally re-entered the country following a 
deportation about the details of that re-entry, including whether a smuggler was 
involved, would not be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See 
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that Miranda warnings were 
required prior to questioning by an IRS agent conducting a civil, non-criminal tax 
investigation when defendant was in custody on another matter because such "tax 
investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions"). 
In Mathis, the IRS agent acknowledged that "there was always the possibility 
during his investigation that his work would end up in a criminal prosecution." Id., 391 
U.S. at In Agent Rees' testimony, he acknowledged that one of the purposes of his 
investigations is to determine whether to prosecute illegal immigrants for illegal re-entry 
or illegal entry (Tr., p.53, Ls.9-20), and that, although he would not be the investigating 
agent for a criminal prosecution, his file would form the basis of any such prosecution. 
(Tr., p.109, Ls.3-14.) Considering the reasoning underlying Mathis, and its similarity to 
the facts of Ms. McLeod's case, there is no reason to conclude that its logic should not 
apply to a determination as to whether Miranda warnings should have been given. 
2. Miranda Warnings Must Be Given To Probationers In Idaho Prior To 
Interrogation 
The second basis upon which the district court overruled defense counsel's 
objection was its belief that probationers are not required to be given Miranda warnings 
prior to being questioned by their probation officers or any other government agent 
because "there is no expectation of the ability to continue to maintain silence by a 
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probationer." (Tr., p.94, Ls.14-18.) The court's conclusion on this point was based on 
its interpretation of an American Law Reports article which it described as follows: 
[T]he authority set out in the ALR, and I regard that as persuasive 
although not binding on the court since it isn't from Idaho, but also 
involves probation officers as opposed to independent third parties; but, 
nevertheless, the court who have so ruled find - and I'm quoting again 
from page 10 of that article, under section 4 - it has been reasoned that 
since the self-incrimination privilege is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
maintenance of a probationary system, a court should not exclude in a 
probation revocation proceeding evidence obtained as the result of a 
probationer's admissions, again it says, to his probation officer, simply 
because the probationer was not given Miranda warnings. 
In this case again, it wasn't a probation officer; but the authority holds 
true[.] 
(Tr., p.94, L.19 - p.95, L.12.) 
Unlike the A.LR. article cited by the district court, Idaho case law requires a 
probation officer to provide an in-custody probationer Miranda warnings prior to 
engaging in the functional equivalent of interrogation. See Harms, 137 Idaho at 895 (so 
holding in a criminal prosecution). 
3. Ms. McLeod Did Not Waive Her Fifth Amendment Rights As A Condition 
Of Probation 
The final basis upon which the district court overruled defense counsel's 
objection was its conclusion that a condition of probation requiring Ms. McLeod, upon 
being contacted by law enforcement personnel, to provide them with her identity, her 
probation status, and the name of her supervising officer required her "in essence ... to 
waive her Fifth Amendment rights, if any, to remain silent." (Tr., p.95, L.13 - p.96, L.7.) 
The specific language of the provision referenced by the district court is as follows: 
The defendant shall obey all municipal, county, state and federal laws. 
The defendant shall comply with all lawful requests of any agent of the 
Idaho Dept. of Correction. The defendant shall be completely truthful at all 
times with any agent of the Idaho Dept. of Correction. During any contact 
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with law enforcement personnel the defendant shall provide their identity, 
notify the officer(s) that they are under supervision and provide the name 
of their supervising officer. The defendant shall notify their supervising 
officer of the contact within 24 hours. 
(R., p.114 (emphasis added).) The district court did not cite to any case law in reaching 
its conclusion that this provision amounted to a preemptive waiver of Ms. McLeod's Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
The district court's conclusion is contradicted by the plain language of the 
probation condition, as well as case law governing the waiver of constitutional rights. 
The plain language of the provision shows that all Ms. McLeod must do when she 
encounters a law enforcement officer is provide her identity, the fact that she is on 
supervision, and the name of her probation officer. Nothing in the provision indicates 
that she is required to answer questions posed to her by law enforcement officers, let 
alone that she must do so when in custody. Unlike the condition of her probation 
relating to searches, 7 there is no explicit reference to any sort of waiver, let alone to her 
rights under the Fifth Amendment. This is especially important in light of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding that, in determining whether there has been a Miranda waiver, 
"The state has a heavy burden and must overcome the presumption against waiver." 
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497 (1983) (citing State v. Fisk, 92 Idaho 675 (1968) 
and Abercrombie v. State, 91 Idaho 586 (1967)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that "[c]onditions of probation, especially a waiver of a Fourth Amendment 
right, cannot be implied." See Klingler, 143 Idaho at 496. 
7 The condition governing searches provides, "The defendant shall consent to the 
search of his/her person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property 
or structures owned or leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the 
controlling authority conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or law 
enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment Rights 
concerning searches." (R., p.115 (emphasis added).) 
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For the reasons set forth herein, the district court erred when it overruled defense 
counsel's Fifth Amendment objection to the use of statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda. The error led to the admission of the only evidence that Ms. McLeod had 
violated federal law by illegally entering the United States, and some of the evidence, 
specifically, the fact that she paid a smuggler $8,000 to help her cross the border was 
used in aggravation by the district court when announcing its decision to revoke her 
probation and to execute the underlying sentence without reduction. (Tr., p.150, Ls.1-
18 ("[T]here's been not one cent paid to these people [in restitution] ... You had money 
to get back into the [United] [S]tates").) As such, Ms. McLeod respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the order revoking her probation, and remand this matter for a new 
probation violation hearing at which her unlawfully obtained statements are not 
considered. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. McLeod respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court's order revoking her probation, and remand this matter to the 
district court for a new probation violation hearing at which her statements to Agent 
Rees are not considered. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2012. 
Deputt State Appellate Public Defender 
.\,_/ 
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